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Effectiveness, Equity, and Ethics of Costa Rica’s Payment for Environmental Services 
Program 
 
Anna Carter 
 
Abstract​: This paper examines the effectiveness of Costa Rica’s Payment for 
Environmental Services, or PSA program, which provides government subsidies to 
participants who protect forested lands or reforest their land. Effectiveness is determined 
in terms of the program’s progress in reversing deforestation and generating reforestation 
efforts, with particular attention paid to the success and failings of the program in 
reaching small landowners. The claim that the PSA program can act as a tool for human 
development is evaluated through its accessibility to small landowners. Finally, the 
ethical costs and benefits of the market based scheme underlying the PSA program as a 
process of commodifying nature is examined, looking to existing literature to determine 
if market based solutions negatively or positively change the values small landowners 
hold about the environment. This paper fills a unique gap in the existing research on 
Costa Rica’s PSA program as it combines practical concerns about the effectiveness of an 
environmental policy with questions of equity and ethics. Methodologies of policy 
analysis, a sociological approach, and philosophical examination of the PSA program are 
synthesized to conclude that the program is somewhat effective in curbing deforestation 
and regenerating reforestation, institutional and financial barriers still restrict small 
landowner access to the program, and ethical concerns about the nature of the program 
have remained unrealized. Answering these questions supports the conclusion that the 
PSA program should continue to be implemented, but understood as only one small part 
of the fight in addressing the climate crisis. 
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Introduction 
 
Comprising only .03% of the planet’s land mass, Costa Rica is home to 6% of the world’s 
plant and animal species, situated in a unique biodiversity hotspot that makes the preservation of 
its forests invaluable (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). Deforestation threatens the health of the 
planet in a variety of ways, including loss of carbon sequestration, loss of oxygen production, 
soil erosion, and loss of biodiversity (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). However, the benefits of 
nature are not seen directly in the daily lives of landowners. When faced with preserving the 
ecosystem of leaf cutter ants, or clearing one’s land to create a plantation that generates profit, 
people ​are wont to choose​ the latter. Much like the rest of Latin America, Costa Rica suffered 
from rampant deforestation from the 1960s through the 1980s, with land largely being cleared 
for agriculture and cattle ranching use (Pagiola 2008). Because environmental services like 
biodiversity, natural beauty, watershed protection, and greenhouse gas mitigation do not have a 
price tag attached to them, they cannot compete in a capitalist market. Beginning in 1997, Costa 
Rica’s Payment for Environmental Services program, or PSA program, was an innovative 
approach to conservation that was intended to halt and reverse deforestation (Pagiola 2008).  
Environmental services are defined as the multiple benefits humans accrue from the 
function of ecosystems. Costa Rica’s PSA program identifies four of these services: greenhouse 
gas mitigation, scenic beauty, hydrological services, and biodiversity (Pagiola 2008). These 
services are not measured individually, but assumed to be a ‘bundle’ equally produced by each 
hectare of land. Services like scenic beauty are particularly difficult to measure and assign a 
price tag, so bundling preserves recognition of the benefit while still maintaining the viability of 
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ecosystem services in a market based system. The PSA program is meant to address the market 
failure of negative externalities, in which the cost of environmental degradation is not factored 
into the final market cost of economic activities like creating a plantation, resort, or factory 
(Silvertown 2015). If those costs are made explicit and payments are made to landowners whose 
property provides environmental services, nature can then become competitive in the market. 
Another touted benefit of payment for environmental services programs include the 
capacity for human development, especially in poor and rural areas (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 
2007). By financially rewarding landowners for preserving their trees or using their land to plant 
new trees, the PSA program can act as a source of additional income without a major investment 
required from participants. While the PSA program cannot replace participants’ primary source 
of income, it acts as supplemental income which can improve the livelihood of small 
landowners. By attaching financial compensation to certain land uses and practices, the PSA 
program also has the potential to positively impact values concerning the environment held by 
small landowners. To see direct financial benefits as a result of environmentally friendly land use 
encourages landowners to be responsible in their interactions with ecosystems, and creates a 
network of landowners with knowledge about sustainable land use that can be spread to 
non-participants.  
Having been implemented for 20 years, there is now a large body of literature available 
on the successes and failings of Costa Rica’s PSA program. A diverse body of research on the 
environmental, economic, and social impacts of the PSA program has developed, and similar 
programs have been implemented in other nations throughout the world. Now that Costa Rica’s 
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program has had two decades to develop, it is important to reflect on its impacts. This paper aims 
to answer three questions: 
 
1.) Has the PSA program been effective in reversing deforestation and generating 
reforestation? 
2.) Has the PSA program been equitable in terms of its accessibility to small 
landowners? 
3.) Has the PSA program impacted the values held by small landowners toward 
nature? 
 
This paper will fill a gap in the existing literature by synthesizing policy concerns of 
effectiveness, sociological concerns of equity, and philosophical concerns of ethics to determine 
whether the PSA program is a viable policy solution that can address the multi-faceted concerns 
of environmental justice. Policy makers cannot be concerned purely with the effectiveness of a 
program, but must also ask questions about for whom and how a program is beneficial. 
Interdisciplinary research methods encourage a variety of viewpoints to be considered, and 
prevent positivist approaches from clouding the understanding of the real human impacts that 
occur when policy is implemented. A purely data driven approach to the PSA program would 
ignore the social and ethical considerations of such a policy. While numerical data is valuable 
and will be used as evidence in following sections, oral interviews conducted by several 
researchers in the field, including Schwartz (2017), Lansing (2014), Schröter et al. (2018), and 
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Ross (2016) with program participants and conceptual, philosophical arguments will also be 
presented as equally valuable evidence to consider when forming a conclusion.  
This paper will argue that Costa Rica’s PSA program is somewhat effective in terms of 
its progress in reversing deforestation and generating reforestation efforts, though issues remain 
in regards to additionality. Additionality is the measure of what practices would have remained 
the same without the implementation of a policy, such as the downward trend in deforestation 
rates already present in Costa Rica before the PSA program. Additionality is a confounding 
factor that must be accounted for when attempting to determine the true impact of a policy on 
individual and societal practices. While policymakers have worked to make the PSA program 
equitable by enrolling more small landowners, many substantial institutional and financial 
barriers remain. No conclusion can be given regarding if small landowners’ values have changed 
due to the ethical ramifications of the PSA program, but I argue that the PSA program should 
continue to be implemented as the conceptual ethical benefits outweigh the potential costs. 
 
Background 
 
The impetus of the PSA program in Costa Rica was the extreme deforestation that had 
been ravaging the nation’s rainforests since the 1960s. Land was cleared primarily for 
agricultural and cattle use, often resulting in monoculture plantations that continue to harm the 
ecosystems around them and support little diversity of life (Arriagada et al. 2015). Large 
corporations such as Del Monte and Dole have the financial capacity to buy out small 
landowners, who may have otherwise used the land in more diverse and sustainable ways. Land 
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was also cleared for timber, an issue that was addressed with the 1996 Forestry Law which 
required the rational use of all natural resources and prohibited change in land cover of existing 
forests, essentially prohibiting logging.  
The PSA program coincided with the establishment of two other environmental laws 
along with the 1996 Forestry Law, including the 1995 Environment Law which requires a 
“balanced and ecologically driven environment for all” and the 1998 Biodiversity Law, which 
requires the conservation and “rational use” of biodiversity resources (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 
2007). These laws created the foundation from which the PSA program could provide payments 
to landowners. By mandating a “balanced” environment and “rational use” of natural and 
biodiversity resources, and by prohibiting the continued use of Costa Rica’s forests for timber, 
these three laws helped create the proper institutional conditions for a program meant to 
economically value environmental services. While a valuable policy, the 1996 Forestry Law in 
particular represents a confounding effect when trying to research the effectiveness of the PSA 
program in reversing deforestation, as deforestation itself was prohibited before the PSA 
program was implemented. The issue of additionality, measuring what would have changed even 
without the implementation of the PSA program, becomes relevant due to this prior prohibition. 
Additionality will be discussed more in depth in the effectiveness section. 
The administration of the PSA program falls to several different organizations. At the 
national level, FONAFIFO, SINAC, and MINAE are the primary bureaucratic means of 
implementing and monitoring the PSA program. FONAFIFO, the Fondo Nacional de 
Financiamiento Forestal, was established under the 1996 Forestry Law as a public 
forestry-financing agency. FONAFIFO is responsible for administering contracts and distributing 
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payments to participants. SINAC, the Sistemas Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, and 
MINAE, the Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía, are responsible for inspection duties such as 
land use monitoring and overall supervision of the program in forested areas (Sanchez-Azofeifa 
et al. 2007). At the local level, NGOs such as the Community Blue Carbon Project act as 
intermediaries between FONAFIFO and small landowners with little experience navigating the 
bureaucratic process (Schröter et al. 2018). Civil society groups assist in spreading knowledge of 
the PSA program and guide landowners who may have otherwise been left out of the program 
due to unfamiliarity with the process or lack of initial funds.  
At the international level, funding has been the primary way of participation. The PSA 
program has received loans from the World Bank’s Ecomercado program, totaling $8 million to 
support contract payments, which funded the program from 2001-2006 (Pagiola 2008). The PSA 
program is also funded through a 3.5% fossil fuel tax, which totals around $10 million each year. 
Hydropower producers also support the PSA program, providing contract payments to the 
landowners who protect watershed basins and hydrological zones. These agreements began as 
voluntary, but thanks to a water tariff established in 2008, a compulsory water conservation fee 
is charged to water users, providing a more consistent and robust funding to FONAFIFO and 
thus the PSA program (Pagiola 2008). Other local and international corporations participate as 
fundors, but usually only provide payments to specified regions or farms that generate 
environmental services that directly benefit that corporation (Schröter et al. 2018). 
The PSA program originally offered three modalities at its inception. Forest conservation 
was and remains the most popular modality. Forest conservation contracts require the 
landowners to protect both primary and secondary forests that remained on their lands for 5 
8 
years. In line with the 1995 Forestry Law, no land-cover change is allowed. Reforestation 
contracts require landowners to plant trees on agricultural or otherwise abandoned land and 
maintain those trees for 15 years (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). The final modality offered was 
sustainable forest management, which has the same requirements as the reforestation contracts 
but allows for landowners to conduct low-intensity logging while participating in reforestation 
efforts on their land. In 2004, FONAFIFO introduced a new modality to the program intended to 
target small landowners. The SAF, Sistemas Agroforestales, program requires that landowners 
have active agricultural or cattle grazing areas on their land, and landowners are compensated for 
each additional tree planted on their land (Cole 2010).  
Payments vary based on modality and the amount of land enrolled in the contract. For 
forest conservation contracts, participants receive equal installments of payments per hectare of 
land for the entire 5 years. Contracts can be renewed after this 5 year period, though this is not a 
requirement, and landowners are free to deforest their land after a contract has ended if they so 
wish. For reforestation contracts, participants receive decreasing installments of payments per 
hectare of land for the first 5 years. 50% is paid in the first year, 20% the second year, and 10% 
the remaining three years. For sustainable forest management contracts, the same schedule of 
payments is followed as reforestation contracts. In 2007, payments per hectare of land were 
US$210 for forest conservation, $537 for reforestation, and $327 for sustainable forest 
management (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). For SAF contracts, participants are paid per tree 
planted, with the 2007 rate at $1.30 per tree. Participants must plant a minimum of 350 trees and 
a maximum of 3500, and must maintain the trees for five years. Payments are received over the 
first three years of the five year period, with 65% of the payment distributed in the first year, 
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20% in the second year, and 15% in the third year (Cole 2010). In terms of livelihood impacts, 
Costa Rican participants largely report using these funds for immediate needs such as clothing, 
food, or school fees (Blundo-Canto et al. 2018). While cash sums are transferred to households 
and sustainable land use practices are successfully implemented, there is no significant 
improvement in the livelihood of households enrolled in the program (Arriagada et al. 2015, 
Blundo-Canto et al. 2018). The program does not financially harm participants, but the income 
supplied by the program is not consistent or large enough to meaningfully change the economic 
situation of participants.  
 
Effectiveness 
  
Deforestation  
While much of the literature concerned with the PSA program examines both cost 
efficiency and effectiveness, I focus on effectiveness. Because there have not been continuous 
studies on the whole of this program, but rather studies of specific geographic areas or certain 
modalities of the program, it is difficult to gauge how effective the PSA program truly is, a 
common issue when evaluating policy.  
10% of Costa Rica’s total forest area is enrolled in the PSA program (Pagiola 2008). A 
study conducted in Northern Costa Rica concludes that PSA participants kept 61% of their land 
under forest cover, compared to 21% for non-participants (Zbinden and Lee 2005). Another 
study in the Osa Peninsula reports that participants had 92% of their land under forest cover, 
compared to 72% of non-participants. However, Pfaff et al. (2008) compared deforestation rates 
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for PSA program participants and non-participants and found almost no impact of the program, 
and that forest cover on those lands would have remained the same even without payments. 
However, this land already had a low probability of suffering from deforestation. Morse et al. 
(2009) examines the San Juan Biological Corridor and compares it with surrounding areas in 
order to determine deforestation rates before and after the PSA program. This study finds that the 
PSA program decreased deforestation in the corridor from 1.43% to .1%, and reports that 50% of 
PSA program participants would have cleared forest from their lands without payments. 
Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. (2007) found that national deforestation rates decreased under the PSA 
program from .06% in 1986-1997 to .03% in 1997-2000.  
This literature speaks to the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of the PSA program. 
There are several factors that limit the ability of researchers to understand the extent to which the 
PSA program has decreased deforestionation in Costa Rica. The first is the confounding factor of 
previous forestry laws. Because the Forestry Law of 1995 already prohibited the clearing of most 
forest lands, 89.1% of the land enrolled in the PSA program would have been conserved even 
without payments (Daniels et al. 2010). As Costa Rica implemented the PSA program in a policy 
mix strategy, where several aggressive environmental protection laws were put into place in a 
short amount of time, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of those previous laws from the 
effects of the PSA program (Pagiola 2008).  
Previous forestry laws lead to another difficulty in addressing the impact of the PSA 
program, additionality. Additionality requires one to imagine a counterfactual scenario in which 
a PSA participant would not be enrolled in the program, and what they would then do with their 
land. The PSA program operates on the assumption that if there is a more profitable option than 
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leaving the forest intact, landowners will clear their land. Calculating additionality is difficult, as 
researchers do not necessarily have access to PSA program participants to determine their 
counterfactuals with certainty, and must estimate additionality based on local market trends and 
the current profitability of other land uses. There is no consistent method used to evaluate 
additionality throughout the literature on the PSA program. Pfaff et al. (2008) use statistical 
pairing of PSA program and non-PSA program farms based on biophysical traits and 
accessibility to determine comparable land use. Morse et al. (2009) compared deforestation rates 
before and after the PSA program in a biological corridor, which is a targeted or high priority 
area, compared to non-targeted areas, and considered the next best land use as gathered from 
farm-level survey data. Sierra and Russman (2006) determined additionality by observing 
non-PSA farm’s land use in the same region. Because there is no standardized method of 
calculating additionality, it can be a struggle to determine the impact of PSA payments on land 
use decisions. In Daniels et al.’s (2010) analysis of the reliability of the previous four studies’ 
methods of calculating additionality, Morse et al.’s (2009) region specific analysis of before and 
after deforestation rates was found to be the most reliable, whereas Sanchez-Azofeifa et al.’s 
(2007) method of comparing before and after national deforestation rates was found to be the 
least reliable. Both Sierra and Russman (2005) and Pfaff et al. (2008) used methods found to be 
moderately reliable, using regional or farm specific data rather than national data. These results 
suggest that additionality can most reliably be measured by identifying regional specific factors 
and counterfactual situations, which is consistent with the variable results produced by studies 
measuring the effectiveness of the policy on reversing deforestation. Landowners do not exist as 
a monolithic group across Costa Rica, and local factors impact their land use decisions. In short, 
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while creating counterfactual situations is not and should not be an exact science, narrowing the 
scope of the data and factors considered when measuring additionality will increase the 
reliability of a researcher’s method.  
Another issue which arises from the design of the PSA program is the lack of targeting of 
high priority lands, such as biological corridors. The PSA program is a voluntary program, in 
which participants self-select. As a result, low priority lands that are at a low risk of 
deforestation, or are already legally barred from deforestation, can be enrolled in the program. 
Because the PSA program receives more applications than it can accept, and has no method of 
filtering low priority lands from high priority lands, this could be negatively impacting the 
effectiveness of the program (Pagiola 2008). However, Pagiola has also suggested that the PSA 
program was offered as a quid pro quo for the prohibition of clearing forests, reducing resistance 
to the initial legislation that is likely responsible for the total decline of deforestation.  
Another confounding factor emerging from the voluntary nature of the program is 
institutional path dependence. Daniels et al. (2010) explains that landowners who participated in 
pre-PSA forest conservation initiatives were over represented in the early cohorts of PSA 
participants. This speaks to the power of information accessibility and familiarity with the 
bureaucratic functions of FONAFIFO. Because these pre-PSA participants had already worked 
with forestry officials and understood the process of enrolling and institutionalizing their land, 
they made up two-thirds of the participants interviewed of the 1998-1999 cohort. In comparison, 
60% of the non-PSA landowners in the same geographical region had zero familiarity with the 
program. Sierra and Russman (2006) further support this claim, noting that early 
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PSA-participants had more familiarity with the program requirements and individuals monitoring 
land use.  
In terms of decreasing deforestation, the majority of the literature available supports the 
conclusion that the program has had little to no impact. On the deforestation front, the program 
was not effective. However, this does not mean that the PSA program has had zero impact on the 
environmental health of Costa Rica, but rather speaks to the aggressive policy mix the country 
implemented just a few short years before the PSA program began. Because there was a ban on 
forest clearing prior to the PSA program, it follows that the program itself is not the sole impetus 
for deforestation decline. Deforestation remains extremely low in Costa Rica, and several studies 
suggest that the true benefit of the PSA program may be its impact on reforestation, which will 
be explored in the next section. 
 
Reforestation  
The PSA program may struggle to reduce already low deforestation rates, but a benefit of 
the program is changes in land use, such as agricultural abandonment and natural forest 
regeneration that prior to PSA would have been cleared (Daniels et al. 2010). By changing the 
land use patterns of PSA participants under the forest conservation modality, the PSA program is 
able to generate even more new forest growth, beyond the capacity of reforestation and SAF 
contracts alone. Sierra and Russman (2006) conclude that PSA participants with forest 
conservation contracts are more likely to abandon agricultural land use when PSA funds are used 
to further economic activities besides agriculture, allowing for new forest growth. However, they 
do caution that this forest regrowth is not covered under forest conservation contracts, thus gains 
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may not be permanent as landowners could clear their land of this new growth without violating 
their contract. They also caution that limitations from fundors like the World Bank require PSA 
funds to go to secondary or primary growth forested lands, not areas where the land has already 
been cleared or degraded. This represents a barrier to expanding the PSA program to non-forest 
areas that could benefit from the program.  
Moreover, there is a gap in research on the success of reforestation contracts. Presumably 
this is due to the assumption that as long as participants in this modality comply with the terms 
of their contract, reforestation would be successful. Unlike forest conservation contracts, there is 
less concern about additionality or confounding factors when considering reforestation contracts, 
as participants would be unlikely to undertake the labor intensive activities required under this 
contract unless they were receiving some sort of compensation. Those who choose to participate 
in the PSA program under the reforestation modality face barriers of high start up costs. The 
establishment costs of a plantation are particularly high during the first four years, due to 
management activities (Montagnini and Finney 2010). By providing 50% of the payment in the 
first year of reforestation activities, the PSA program does attempt to cover part of this initial 
cost and reduce the burden on landowners. The additional benefit of natural forest regeneration 
from land conservation contracts is obviously slower and less intentional than reforestation 
contracts, as the regenerated forest is not receiving the same level of management and care as 
provided by the reforestation modality. However, due to the sheer number of forest conservation 
contracts under the PSA program, this additional forest growth is a significant side effect. The 
payments for forest conservation contracts were larger than both reforestation and forest 
management contracts combined at the beginning of the program (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007).  
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Another more recent revision of the PSA program is the SAF modality. The SAF 
modality allows farmers to continue to use their land for farming, called agroforestry systems, 
and for cattle ranching, called agrosilvopastoral systems, while planting trees. These systems 
prevent land degradation, which is marked by soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, contamination of 
water sources, and decreased agricultural productivity (Montagnini and Finney 2010). Cattle 
ranching and aggressive farming lead to land degradation, which inhibits forest regrowth when 
that land is abandoned from further use. By paying farmers per tree planted, the PSA program is 
not only able to generate reforestation, but it also protects biodiversity in agricultural lands, and 
improves the nutrient cycling in soil. SAF contracts force farmers to abandon monoculture 
plantations, in which one agricultural product is intensively farmed, degrading the land and 
preventing any survival of native plant or animal species from thriving. Montagnini and Finney 
report that farms participating in SAF modalities have the same levels of species richness as 
secondary growth forests. The accessibility of the SAF modality to small landowners will be 
discussed later in this paper.  
 
Equity 
 
Participation Patterns  
One of the supposed benefits of payments for environmental services programs is their 
ability to address environmental concerns while improving human development through 
supplemental income. While improving the livelihood of small landowners was not the top 
priority when Costa Rica was developing its PSA program, it is meant to be one of the 
16 
advantages of these schemes in general. The question then becomes whether PSA participation is 
accessible to this population in the first place. Without knowledge of the program and the skills 
to navigate the administrative aspects of PSA, these benefits of positive human development will 
remain unrealized.  
Zbinden and Lee (2005) found that large landowners were disproportionately represented 
in the program compared to small landowners. In addition, PSA participants were more likely to 
be better educated, more urban-dwelling, more reliant on non-agricultural sources of income, and 
have higher agricultural incomes than non-participants. Zbinden and Lee identify three major 
influences in participation for the PSA program, which include farm size, human capital, and 
information. Those with larger farms serve to benefit more financially from the program than 
small landowners, as they face similar start up costs yet receive larger payments because of their 
land size. Human capital includes years of education and non-agricultural management skills, 
both of which are usually greater in large landowners because of their relative wealth to small 
landowners. The ability to understand and perform the administrative tasks required of the PSA 
program puts larger and more wealthy landowners at an advantage. Information is crucial for this 
imbalance, as Zbinden and Lee found that 61% of non-participants were unfamiliar with even the 
basics of the PSA program. Small landowners are less likely to come into personal contact with 
intermediary forestry officials responsible for delivering administrative tasks to participants and 
provide information about the program. These intermediary roles are considered essential in 
making the program more accessible to small landowners, and some community organizations 
have formed to fill this information gap.  
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Lansing (2017) expresses a similar sentiment as Zbinden and Lee, noting that access to 
forestry programs requires engaging with state institutions that are unfamiliar to small 
landowners, whereas large landowners are likely to have more experience with these institutions 
and thus have more successful interactions. Lansing also found that even among small 
landowners, wealthy households out-participated medium and poor households, with wealthy 
households comprising 31.5% of participants, medium households 16.9%, and poor households 
at 15%. Of small landowner participants, the predictors for enrollment were older households 
with primarily non-agricultural income and labor. This is similar to Zbinden and Lee’s 
conclusion about large landowners’ income ratio. Lansing suggests that wealthy small 
landowners are only part-time farmers, with their income coming from professional salaries, a 
similarity with large landowners. Lansing notes that the older household factor of small 
landowner participants is not held common with Zbinden and Lee’s work on larger landowners, 
but is a feature unique to small landowners. Older heads of house are more likely to enroll in the 
PSA program as a sort of retirement plan.  
 
Multi-Institutional Property Barriers  
There are several significant barriers in place that prevent small landowners from 
participating in the PSA program. Lansing (2014) identifies the most significant being the 
demands of property regularization, disjointed state institutions, and historical patterns of rural 
settlement. Despite intentional efforts by the state to revise the program and make it more “poor 
friendly,” the PSA program continues to enroll significantly more large and wealthy landowners 
than small and poor landowners (Lansing 2017). As discussed above, a small landowner does not 
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necessarily correlate as a poor landowner, but even wealthy and small landowners are 
underrepresented compared to large landowners. From 1997-2008, 39% of PSA funds went to 
corporately owned lands, with only 1% going to small landowners who own state agrarian 
reform lands (the Costa Rican acronym IDA will be used from here out to refer to state agrarian 
reform lands) (Lansing 2014). The legibility of land ownership and lack of proper documentation 
is the primary barrier IDA farmers face when attempting to gain access to the PSA program. 
Land title regularization began in 2001 and is an ongoing process. Costa Rica has two different 
agencies responsible for recognizing the boundaries of one’s land and the official owner of one’s 
land. The Land Property Registry records the titles of purchased land, while the Cadastral 
Nacional stores the official cadastral surveys which mark the boundaries of one’s land. Because 
two separate institutions are responsible for land regularization, there are often discrepancies 
between the title and cadastral surveys, leading to property disputes and illegible claims of 
ownership. The 2001 reform of land title regularization was meant to resolve these discrepancies.  
Unfortunately, regularization and legibility of land ownership is further complicated by 
ambiguous land claims. Land squatting under Costa Rican law is a valid claim to property 
ownership if one has been residing there for ten years. While no longer common, this was a 
method by which poor peasants could obtain property. While squatters would obtain the land 
title, they often would not have a cadastral survey conducted. And if a cadastral survey was 
performed, there are still discrepancies between the official land title and the official survey. It is 
costly and requires familiarity with state institutions to fix inconsistencies in land titles and the 
cadastral surveys, preventing those who obtained their land through squatting from participating 
in the program. Lansing notes in an interview with an NGO worker responsible for increasing 
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small landowner participation, the status of the land title and the cadastral survey is one of the 
first screening questions asked. Unfortunately for small landowners, the cost of making their 
land claims legible outweighs the financial gains of the PSA program. Once there are financial 
barriers to the application process, many small landowners are unable to apply.  
IDA land causes even more problems for property regularization. IDA lands are 
settlements with basic infrastructure where tracts of land are distributed to the poor, who can 
then pay off the land over a fifteen year period. During that fifteen year period, the land is still 
owned by the IDA. The purpose of IDA land is to be developed for agricultural use so that 
residents have a steady source of income. This is directly in conflict with the goal of the PSA 
program, which is to reduce agricultural land use and encourage reforestation. Thus, until 2003 
IDA landowners were not legally permitted to enroll in the PSA program. In 2003, the IDA 
agreed that landowners could participate in the PSA program, but only if their land payments 
were up to date. Lansing identifies this payment clause as the primary barrier to IDA landowner 
enrollment, as it is more than common for IDA landowners to fall behind on payment or illicitly 
rent their land to others. The IDA debt clause is a major reason that IDA landowners make up 
only 1% of the PSA contracts, punishing the poor for their own socio-economic status and 
restricting small landowner participation in the program.  
 
SAF Modality 
One method by which the state has attempted to remedy the exclusion of small 
landowners is  the introduction of agroforestry and silvopastoral systems. The SAF modality was 
developed with the goal of targeting small landowners in low socioeconomic regions, including 
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regions with high concentrations of indigenous people (Cole 2010). By allowing landowners to 
use their land for agricultural and cattle purposes, often the primary source of income for small 
landowners, the SAF modality offers an opportunity for previously excluded groups to 
participate in the PSA program. This is significant concerning participation patterns of small 
landowners, as the majority are wealthy and make most of their income from non-agricultural, 
professional activities (Lansing 2017). By targeting low socio-economic regions and requiring 
that participants use their land for agricultural or cattle purposes, the SAF modality can attract a 
larger portion of poor landowners, instead of wealthy landowners.  
Another question concerning the SAF modality is how much it benefits small 
landowners. Receiving US$1.30 for each tree planted, with a minimum of 350 trees, the sum of 
the payments is not very large. Cole (2010) reports that 78% of SAF participants said that their 
income level had increased, and that payments exceeded the planting expenses, particularly in 
indigenous communities dependent upon subsistence farming. Payments were used for farm 
improvements or for immediate needs like clothing or school fees. Cole also notes indirect 
socioeconomic benefits of the SAF modality, as a farmers’ association in Biolley used the tree 
planting as a way to recruit volunteers and ecotourists to their region. As discussed previously, 
one of the essential factors that can make or break the success of the SAF modality are 
intermediary actors. Community level organizations such as human development NGOs and 
farmers’ associations played crucial roles in communicating program requirements, facilitating 
workshops with forestry officials, and providing technical support for farmers. Access to 
institutional mechanisms remains a barrier, as landowners who entered SAF contracts 
independently reported difficulty understanding contract requirements and interacting with 
21 
forestry officials. The establishment of community organizations that can facilitate interactions 
with FONAFIFO, SINAC, MINAE, and the forestry officials is vital to making modalities like 
SAF successful in reaching their target populations.  
 
Ethics 
 
Intrinsic Values, Exploitation, and Commodification  
In addition to judging the effectiveness and equity of the PSA program, ethical questions 
must be considered. Environmental services as a concept creates a transactional relationship 
between humans and nature, in which people profit off the environment and define what parts of 
the environment are considered valuable to humans. The next three sections of this paper will be 
dedicated to examining the issues that arise from a neoliberal understanding of environmental 
services, how institutionalizing these programs creates a paradigm that resists deconstruction, 
and examining the actual and potential impacts on human-nature relationships of small 
landowner PSA participants. Before examining these factors, I will provide an outline of 
common ethical critiques and advantages of environmental services.  
Schröter et al. (2014) consider several common critiques and counter-arguments 
surrounding the concept of environmental services. Note that these critiques are not specific to 
Costa Rica’s PSA program, but are applied to the concept of environmental services themselves. 
I will use the term PSA program to refer to Costa Rica’s specific program, and PES schemes to 
refer to the general practice of payments for environmental services. The first of such critiques is 
the anthropocentric nature of environmental services. Environmental services are identified only 
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as they are beneficial to humans. Costa Rica’s PSA program specifically identifies four bundled 
services: greenhouse gas mitigation, scenic beauty, hydrological services, and biodiversity. By 
picking and choosing elements of the environment advantageous for humans, PES schemes 
exclude the intrinsic value of nature. Even if climate change precipitates a major human 
extinction, the environment will continue to change and regulate itself. There is reason to argue 
that the environment should be valued as a thing in and of itself, regardless of its relationship to 
humans. This is a biocentric form of reasoning in which nature has intrinsic value, rather than an 
anthropocentric form of reasoning in which nature has only instrumental values as related to 
humans. A counter-argument is that anthropocentric reasoning is not mutually exclusive to 
biocentric reasoning. Humans can recognize the intrinsic value of nature while recognizing the 
instrumental values through which we benefit. This anthropocentric reasoning is not necessarily 
negative, but rather a method through which arguments for the sustainable use of the 
environment can be made more legible in decision-making.  
Another critique of the ES concept is that it forms an exploitative relationship between 
humans and nature. Casting the environment as a producer of services casts humans as 
consumers of the environment, rather than an integrated part of the environment. Nature’s 
position as a product further alienates humans from engaging with the intrinsic value of the 
environment. If this becomes the primary way in which humans imagine the environment, it can 
damage our interactions with nature due to the exploitative mindset. This transactional and 
profit-driven view of nature is already present in the fossil fuel industry, logging industry, and 
many other corporate entities which depend on natural resources to both produce and profit. PES 
schemes run a particular danger because this mindset would be extended to everyday workers, 
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further complicating the ability of the world to respond to climate change. A counter-argument to 
this is that environmental services can actually serve as a conduit through which humans can 
reconnect with nature. This could be especially influential in the Western world, where 
modernization has led people to become increasingly removed from the environment. By 
identifying specific and often intangible services that the environment provides, such as scenic 
beauty, PES schemes posit financial value that can be understood by modern consumers. 
Without a specific price tag conferring a tangible value on these intangible services, consumers 
may ignore the necessary benefits of nature and continue to create negative externalities of 
environmental degradation. Instead of alienating humans from nature, PES schemes could force 
us to acknowledge the true value the environment holds for human well-being.  
The final critique is the economic valuation of environmental services. This is essentially 
a ‘slippery slope’ argument, in which the economic valuation of some select environmental 
services, like greenhouse gas mitigation, could lead to the economic valuation of things like the 
sun, ocean currents, or gravity. This critique argues against the commodification of previously 
non-marketed areas. Formerly organic relations between humans and nature become commercial 
relationships through PES schemes. A classic Marxist critique of commodification is offered by 
Gomez-Baggethun and Perez (2011), in which capitalist modes of production recast previously 
complex social relationships into transactional exchange relationships between objects. 
Commodification resulting from economic valuation mystifies and obscures environmental 
services, reducing ecological complexity and the many biotic and abiotic factors that generate 
environmental services to a transactional market-based system. A counter-argument to this 
critique is that economic valuation of environmental services does not mean that these services 
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are not valued for non-economic reasons, but rather provides a way of assigning value that can 
be used in economic and political decision-making to protect the environment. Environmental 
services are limited and scarce resources, unlike the sun, ocean currents, or gravity. The 
commodification of nature to make the value of its services legible under current economic and 
political conditions does not mean that commodification is the only relationship humans can 
cultivate with nature.  
 
PES Schemes and Neoliberalism 
PES schemes often come under fire from critics as neoliberal policies that create 
transactional relationships, commodify nature, and require the privatization and regulation of 
ecosystem functions and property rights. Lansing (2014) argues that while PES schemes often 
function as state subsidies rather than market-mediated sales, the necessity of property 
regularization and privatization causes many of the same negative outcomes as neoliberal 
policies. Land regularization leads to the exclusion of some groups and ignores cultural or local 
practices of land use or ownership. As described previously, Costa Rica runs into problems with 
the exclusion of IDA landowners and land squatters, who lack the funds to make their land 
ownership claims legible under the requirements of the PSA program and other governmental 
institutions. Rather than locating the problem in the PSA program itself, Lansing concludes that 
it is the interaction between multiple state institutions that leads to the exclusion of some 
landowners.  
While Lansing separates PES schemes from neoliberalism as state subsidies, others have 
critiqued PES schemes specifically for their emergence under a neoliberal framework. 
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Silvertown (2015) defines neoliberalism as “the philosophy that seeks the deregulation of 
markets and the privatization of all possible goods and services” (643). Silvertown goes on to 
claim that nature is actually devalued by monetization, and casts the decision to monetize nature 
as a moral choice rather than an economic imperative. This is a direct contestation of Constanza 
et al.’s (2014) claim that humans no longer have a choice under current economic and political 
conditions to not use monetary valuation for conservation efforts. Silvertown argues that the 
claim that monetization of ES is the only option left to protect biodiversity and other 
environmental services has not been systematically tested, but continues to be supported because 
the issue is framed in a way which prevents other options from being considered. The paradigm 
surrounding environmental services presents the issue in such a way that valuation of nature for 
its intrinsic benefits is seen as insufficient to justify protection, which falsely assumes that people 
only care about something if it has a market-value. Not only is this a cynical mindset from which 
to view people, it is also a narrow mindset that ignores the many counterexamples through which 
people and institutions have acted collectively without financial incentive to protect global 
commons. An example of this capability is the Montreal Protocol, in which world governments 
were able to cooperate to prevent environmental and human harm from the depleted ozone layer. 
Despite resistance from the chlorofluorocarbon industry due to market losses they would suffer 
in the transition from CFCs to HCFCs, people and institutions were able to recognize the many 
non-monetary benefits of an intact ozone layer.  
 
PES Paradigms 
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Following the criticism of PES schemes as agents of neoliberalism, there is more to be 
said concerning the “paradigms” of ES, and how it can create ignorance. As PES schemes 
become adopted by more and more nations, the collective understanding of how to address 
conservation concerns becomes more limited. Institutions such as the United Nations form 
organizations like REDD+ which facilitate PES schemes globally, further cementing PES 
schemes as ​the ​solution for mitigating the externalities of environmental services. Muradian et al. 
(2013) note the fatal attraction of “win-win” solutions, or policies that address environmental 
concerns and human development. These researchers illuminate the parallels between the 
dissemination of PES schemes with the dissemination of “integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDPs)” which gained popularity after the Rio Summit on Sustainable 
Development (Muradian et al. 2013). Revisiting the success of these projects a decade later, it 
was found that ICDPs had made little progress in promoting conservation or human 
development. When attractive “win-win” policies are presented to policy makers with the 
resources to quickly implement them, unintended consequences are unaccounted for, and 
alternate options can be rejected in the face of the current policy paradigm. The simplicity of 
PES schemes is alluring, yet also illusory, as policies that refuse to take local context into 
account can fail. This can be seen in Costa Rica’s PSA program by their failure to account for 
IDA landowners, thus creating a policy which excludes the demographic, rural and poor 
landowners, that the human development side of the program is meant to target.  
Establishing PES schemes as the dominant framework to address ecological conservation 
can also have the consequence of devaluing local knowledge. Institutionally driven policies can 
strip local and indigenous people of environmental practices that may have been successful and 
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sustainable, replacing them with financially driven, neoliberal practices. Lohmann (2008) 
discusses the “production of ignorance” that often accompanies development projects, such as 
market construction, rural income programs, and surveying and mapping. The solution presented 
by PES schemes becomes epistemically privileged in the minds of institutional actors, as the 
truth of the knowledge of PES schemes is validated by organizations like the United Nations and 
REDD+. Knowledge and solutions produced by local people is then at an epistemic 
disadvantage, as that knowledge fails to be validated by these same institutions. If locally 
developed solutions are brushed aside for the sake of a paradigm that does not necessarily have 
the evidence to support its claims, institutions can create patterns of ignorance. Ignorance of the 
mechanisms of climate change, now simplified by the appeal of “win-win” solutions, falsely 
constructs a narrative in which communities are unable to find solutions for sustainable living 
without turning to financial incentives. The dominance of these solutions suppresses local 
engagement with the climate crisis and creates a sense of complacency in which people trust that 
the solutions considered the most attractive are the solutions that are the most effective and 
equitable.  
The epistemic privileging of knowledge produced through institutional solutions such as 
PES schemes can be mitigated by the involvement of civil society organizations. Serving as 
intermediaries between local communities, fundors, and governmental administrations like 
FONAFIFO and MINAE, civil society organizations can balance the power dynamic between 
local communities and institutions. Schröter et al. (2018) examine the impact of the Community 
Blue Carbon Project (CBCP) in Costa Rica, which worked with local fishermen to protect 
mangrove areas. Companies that benefited from the services provided by the mangroves were the 
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fundors in this case. By establishing networks of trust between leaders in the CBCP, local 
fishermen, and representatives of the company, this organization was able to head off the issue of 
epistemic privilege. Fishermen familiar with the ecology of the mangrove areas were able to 
contribute their local knowledge, and were in turn more trusting of an outside expert on 
mangrove conservation provided by the CBCP. Organizations focused on both social and 
environmental justice working with local communities is one method by which PES schemes can 
avoid entrenching themselves as a paradigm that resists deconstruction and obscures alternate 
sources of knowledge. By retaining awareness of the power and knowledge imbalances that 
policies like PES schemes can create, steps can be taken to prevent this negative consequence.  
 
Ethical Impacts on Small Landowners 
The final philosophical consideration is the impact the PSA program has on small 
landowners’ engagement and relationship with the environment. Unfortunately, there is little 
literature which addresses the question of PSA programs participants before-and-after attitudes. 
Despite this gap in research, there is some evidence available which begins to sketch a picture of 
the potential ethical impacts of the PSA program. A potential positive impact on small 
landowners’ attitude toward nature is the tangible value placed on ‘undesirable’ land. Land not 
fit for agricultural or cattle purposes is undesirable because it is not profitable, but the SAF 
modality allows landowners to profit by planting trees there. This can encourage landowners to 
value nature for the indirect benefits of environmental services, along with the direct benefits 
that stem from agricultural or cattle use. The accelerated agricultural land abandonment resulting 
from forest conservation contract participants could also be a positive ethical impact of the PSA 
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program, as landowners abandon traditional views about natural regrowth as encroaching on 
their property and instead embrace regrowth for its positive environmental impacts. Participants 
in the PSA program also have the capacity of gaining new knowledge about the benefits of 
sustainable land use which can then be diffused locally to non-participants, strengthening 
community knowledge to live sustainably.  
Another possibility is that participation in the PSA program may not impact participants’ 
values at all, but rather enable people to engage in activities that align with already held values. 
Ross (2016), Schwartz (2017), Arriagada et al. (2015), and Cole (2010) conducted interviews 
with small landowner participants in different PSA modalities, and all found non-financial, 
environmental motives for participation. A barrier to sustainable land use is poverty, in which 
basic needs for survival must be prioritized over sustainable practices. Heads of households must 
make decisions about whether to leave forest on their land intact and receive no profit, or clear 
that land and receive funds that could provide food, clothing, or schooling to their family. The 
PSA program could be a way for small landowners to enact values they already hold, and 
improve their knowledge of how to live sustainability without undue cost.  
One would be remiss to assume that the PSA program would have solely positive 
impacts. General critiques of the PSA program and PES schemes overall include the 
transactional relationship it establishes between humans and nature. This only furthers the 
commodification of land and nature that small landowners are already exposed to due to their 
socioeconomic position. The environment becomes a product that one can and must use in order 
to survive. The intrinsic value of nature can be lost when programs like PSA assign monetary 
value, resulting in a mindset of exploitation directed toward the environment. This negative 
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impact has the potential of distancing people from the lifestyle changes necessary to address the 
climate crisis. If nature is only useful as far as it benefits an individual directly, it could become 
difficult to justify to landowners why they should not use slash and burn agricultural techniques 
on land that isn’t enrolled in the program. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are a variety of challenges facing the effectiveness, equity, and ethics of Costa 
Rica’s PSA program. Rather than remain static and allow these problems to ferment, actions 
have been taken at local and national levels, as civil society organizations work to correct local 
issues and new modalities of the program, such as SAF, are introduced. Like many 
environmental and social programs, there are barriers that can only be discovered after the 
implementation of the program, such as the illegibility of traditional means of property 
ownership. By synthesizing literature addressing policy, sociological, and philosophical concerns 
that arise from the PSA program, this paper has highlighted shortcomings of the program and 
research gaps concerning its impact.  
Though measures of effectiveness show limited impacts on reducing deforestation, the 
benefits from encouraging reforestation, teaching and diffusing responsible land use methods, 
and breaking traditions of slash and burn agriculture make the program worthwhile to continue. 
This assessment is further supported by the conclusions drawn concerning equity and ethics. 
While small landowners remain at a disadvantage in terms of access to the program, national and 
community institutions are aware of this disparity and have made efforts to change. Ultimately, it 
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is the interaction of many different institutions which restricts small landowner access to the 
program, a barrier which can only be addressed by continued efforts to make all government 
institutions more accessible to the public. Farmers’ associations, civil society organizations, and 
forestry officials must build social networks within local communities which support the 
knowledge necessary for small landowners to successfully interact with unfamiliar institutions. 
There are many potential ethical concerns that originate from the concept of environmental 
services, but those concerns have largely been unrealized in Costa Rica’s case, and as with 
equity concerns, can be mitigated through strong social networks created at a local level. Oral 
interviews consistently support non-financial motivations behind participants’ decisions to enroll 
in the program (Schwartz 2017, Ross 2010, Lansing 2014), suggesting that participants do not 
fall victim to the concerns of commodification and nor lose sight of the intrinsic values of nature 
for instrumental ones.  
Further research is needed in the social areas of Costa Rica’s PSA program. Little 
research exists in which the the attitude and values of Costa Rican landowners are considered, a 
subject which is often discounted in policy considerations. Examining the motivations of 
participants before and after enrolling in the program, and any changes in values they hold 
toward nature could demonstrate the benefits of the PSA program and provide justifications to 
continue the program unrelated to financial or environmental concerns. Further research on the 
livelihood impacts of the PSA program for small landowners compared to large landowners is 
also necessary. There is still limited research which examines how PSA income impacts the daily 
functioning of small landowners, and whether there are even greater wealth disparities created 
because of large landowners improved access to PSA funds.  
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While PES schemes have been adopted on an international scale, they are less common in 
developed nations, due to their characterization as a human development project. I argue PES 
schemes could find success on a state-level and a local-level scale in the United States. I 
recommend state and local-level ventures because of the issues in measuring effectiveness and 
the confounding factor of additionality present in Costa Rica’s program. For example, the 
Florida state legislature could enact a PES scheme in order to protect ecologically valued but 
financially devalued wetlands. Wetlands are inhabitable by humans and are often degraded for 
real estate or development projects. By explicitly monetizing the services wetlands provide, 
Florida could more efficiently and effectively deter wetland degradation than by the command 
and control approach that is currently implemented (Texas A&M AgriLife Extension 2007).  
A final note of caution considering the widespread acceptance of PES schemes is related 
to Lohmann’s (2008) concern about establishing paradigms of thoughts in regard to addressing 
the climate crisis. PES schemes are not and should not be the only solutions considered when 
attempting to protect ecologically valuable lands. Instead, PES schemes should be thought of as 
one piece of the puzzle in addressing climate change and environmental degradation. The 
institutional acceptance of PES schemes is not a negative, but the popularity of this solution and 
focus on changing individuals’ practices must not obscure the corporate forces that are 
responsible for mass deforestation and land degradation. Corporate entities such as Dole and Del 
Monte generate much more profit through ecologically destructive monoculture plantations than 
any PES scheme could provide them, and PES schemes are not a solution for the problems 
created by late stage capitalism. PES schemes work as voluntary, market based programs that 
integrate cleanly into already existing capitalist structures. These non-radical solutions are an 
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important step in the fight against the climate crisis, but in the face of globalized corporate 
forces, voluntary solutions can only be a small part of the picture. Collective solutions such as 
the Paris Accords must come to be accepted by governments along with strong enforcement 
methods in order to do the work humanity needs to address the climate crisis.  
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